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Abstract:  It may be a myth that Plato wrote over the entrance to the Academy “Let no-one 
ignorant of geometry enter here.” But it is a well-chosen motto for his view in the Republic that 
mathematical training is especially productive of understanding in abstract realms, notably 
ethics. That view is sound and we should return to it. Ethical theory has been bedevilled by the 
idea that ethics is fundamentally about actions (right and wrong, rights, duties, virtues, 
dilemmas and so on). That is an error like the one Plato mentions of thinking mathematics is 
about actions (of adding, constructing, extracting roots and so on). Mathematics is about eternal 
relations between universals, such as the ratio of the diagonal of a square to the side. Ethics too 
is about eternal verities, such as the equal worth of persons and just distributions. Mathematical 
and ethical verities do both constrain actions, such as the possibility of walking over the seven 
bridges of Königsberg once and once only or of justly discriminating between races. But they 
are not themselves about action. In principle, neither mathematical nor ethical verities are 
subject to historical forces or disagreement among tribes (though they can be better understood 
as time goes on). Plato is right: immersion in mathematics induces an understanding of the 
necessities underpinning reality, an understanding that is essential for distinguishing objective 
ethics from tribal custom. Equality, for example, is an abstract concept which is foundational 
for both mathematics and ethics. 
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For those seeking to defend the objectivity of ethics within a realist framework,1 emphasising 
its parallels with mathematics is an attractive line of argument. Arguments for ethical relativism 
arising from the mere fact that ethical principles are held by people and have evolved through 
natural causes face the objection that mathematical truths do not have their objectivity 
impugned by similar considerations.2 The fact that ethical knowledge (if there is any) seems to 
be a priori, arising from pure thinking rather than measurement or scientific observation, is 
also something it shares with mathematical knowledge,3 so cannot in itself tell against the 
objectivity of ethics. 
There are certainly some obstacles that stand in the way of using the parallel with mathematics 
to bolster objectivist views of ethics. Some philosophies of both ethics and mathematics 
undermine the parallel. For example, non-cognitivist philosophies of ethics that see it as 
fundamentally a set of techniques about action developed for evolutionary and social reasons, 
as “traffic rules for self-assertors”,4 deny that ethics is a body of truths about a subject matter. 
From the other direction, some popular anti-realist philosophies of mathematics also deny that 
mathematics is a genuinely contentful science of a subject matter. At one time Peter Singer 
argued: 
The defenders of ethical intuitionism argued that there was a parallel in the way we know 
or could immediately grasp the basic truths of mathematics: that one plus one equals two, 
for instance. This argument suffered a blow when it was shown that the self evidence of 
the basic truths of mathematics could be explained in a different and more parsimonious 
way, by seeing mathematics as a system of tautologies, the basic elements of which are 
true by virtue of the meanings of the terms used. On this view, now widely, if not 
universally, accepted, no special intuition is required to establish that one plus one equals 
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two − this is a logical truth, true by virtue of the meanings given to the integers ‘one’ and 
‘two’ , as well as ‘plus’ and ‘equals’. So the idea that intuition provides some substantive 
kind of knowledge of right and wrong lost its only analogue.5 
That philosophy of mathematics is not universally or even widely accepted. In fact it has had 
hardly any adherents in philosophy since Frege and Russell found it untenable over a hundred 
years ago.6 But the persistence of such views does show that realist philosophies of 
mathematics cannot be taken for granted any more than realist philosophies of ethics can be. 
Indeed, one could in principle use the mathematics-ethics analogy to support an anti-realist or 
pluralist view of both.7 Justin Clarke-Doane’s pluralist view based on accepting close parallels 
between mathematics and ethics will be considered in section 5 below. 
To understand the possibilities for comparing realist approaches to ethics and mathematics, we 
need to return to the source, Plato’s Republic. 
 
2. Plato’s Mathematical “Good” 
Plato’s idea is that insight into the necessities of mathematics is apt for training the mind to 
love the necessities of ethics. The reason for that is the close connection between ethical and 
mathematical truths. Hence the ruler well-trained in mathematics is motivated to make this 
world conform to those necessities, as far as possible.  
What we have to consider is whether the greater and more advanced part of 
[mathematics] tends to facilitate the apprehension of the idea of good. That tendency, we 
affirm, is to be found in all studies that force the soul to turn its vision round to the region 
where dwells the most blessed part of reality, which it is imperative that it should behold.8 
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That is the thought summarized in the inscription over the entrance to the Academy, “Let no-
one ignorant of geometry enter here.” The inscription is probably apocryphal,9 but has always 
been recognized as an accurate slogan for Plato’s thought. 
Plato’s treatment is inspiring for any attempt to revive the connection between mathematics 
and ethics, though also disappointing because of his alien view of the nature of the Good. 
Plato adds some explanation of what it is exactly about mathematics that trains the intellectual 
powers of the mind in a certain way. The relevant aspects of mathematics are not, for example, 
its being about quantity, or even its being organized as a structure of theorems derived from 
axioms. It is instead something about how the act of understanding in mathematics leads the 
mind to contemplate the purely intelligible realities that stand behind appearances. What 
mathematicians see, such as drawn lines in diagrams, is one thing, what they understand by 
them is another. He writes:  
[mathematicians] further make use of the visible forms and talk about them, though they 
are not thinking of them but of those things of which they are a likeness, pursuing their 
inquiry for the sake of the square as such and the diagonal as such, and not for the sake 
of the image of it which they draw. And so in all cases. The very things which they mould 
and draw, which have shadows and images of themselves in water, these things they treat 
in their turn as only images, but what they really seek is to get sight of those realities 
which can be seen only by the mind.10 
That is correct. Geometrical knowledge involves an intellectual “rectification” of imprecise 
perceptual experience. We can gain the idea of a perfect square by looking at imperfect squares, 
and we then see imperfect squares as approximating perfect ones. The geometrical knowledge 
that Plato extracts from the slave-boy in the Meno is of the relation of perfect squares, although 
the diagrams drawn by the participants are far from perfect squares. The incommensurability 
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of the diagonal and side of a perfect square has no meaning for the approximate squares drawn 
to illustrate it; incommensurability is not detectable by the senses.11 Mathematical knowledge 
thus trains the mind to see “realities which can be seen only by the mind,” though ones which 
cast light on the realities that are seen by the eye. 
Ethics too involves a comparison between what is, which can be seen “by the eye”, and what 
ought to be, which can in general only be understood, that is, grasped by an intellectual 
operation (which is not to deny the existence of moral perception in some cases, parallel to the 
perception of the simplest mathematical necessities12). If a distribution of resources differs 
from a just division, the actual distribution can be measured but the just one is a standard 
recognisable only by thought. If an act of killing was in self-defence, that fact can be established 
without moral input, but whether it was justified requires reference to an outside ethical 
standard which can only be accessed by the mind. Thus training in the necessities of 
mathematics has at least the potential to induce an appreciation of the difference between 
observational facts and abstract standards which can be appreciated only by the understanding. 
It is true that the content of Plato’s ethical thought is disappointing, from a present-day ethical 
perspective. What is alien about Plato’s (and Aristotle’s) ethics is its lack of two ingredients 
that post-Christian ethics takes to be foundational of any ethical project – the equality of 
persons13 and the virtue of charity or benevolence. Aquinas, in synthesising Christian ethics 
with the classical inheritance, has to add to the ancient “philosophical” virtues the three 
“theological” virtues of faith, hope and charity. It is clear enough why faith and hope should 
be theological virtues, but the fact that caritas (covering the whole field of our love, charity, 
benevolence and care) has to be added reveals a large hole in Greek ethics.14 And even the 
philosophical virtue of “justice” does not, in Greek ethics, have the modern implication that 
the equality of persons demands equal and thus just treatment of each. Plato’s “justice” is much 
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more an attunement or harmony of society, such as when artisans and guardians both know 
their place and fulfil their mutually beneficial roles. 
Plato’s model of the Good is thus more like harmony in music.15 Harmony can be heard and 
can sound beautiful, but the superior science of music involves an intellectual study of why 
that is so, of the mathematics of integer ratios such as the octave and fifth that explain (heard) 
harmony.16 “Ethics” is then modelled as harmony – that is, on the mathematical system of ratios 
that stands behind heard harmonies and so can be realized in other categories (such as planetary 
motions). Justice is defined as an attunement, in the first instance in the soul17 and later in the 
structure of the perfect state. 
Thus in Plato, “the Good is described formally, even mathematically, it is ratio.” Or at least, if 
the Good is strictly speaking ineffable, “Measure is the Good in so far as it can be grasped by 
reason.”18 The kind of thing to be expected when this world imitates the Good as far as it can 
is the heavenly bodies’ using spheres and circles because those are the best of all shapes.19 
Aristotle’s mathematical account of “justice” betrays the same close conceptual connection 
between the “just” and ratio as in Plato, even though it does discuss cases of justice that are 
closer to our ethical meaning of the word, such as compensation for fraud. His argument that a 
just division is a proportional one does not rely on any ethical premises. The reason he gives is 
simply that the just is a species of the proportional and he feels that needs no further 
justification.20 
To modern ethical sensibilities, Plato and to a lesser extent Aristotle have moved far beyond 
what can be called genuinely ethical. The Good is, as Plato puts it, “greater than justice and the 
other virtues.”21 To the extent that their discussion is about the Good at all, it is closer to what 
we would call the aesthetic than the ethical good (with the aesthetic good being interpreted 
realistically, not as a matter of human response). Indeed Aquinas, again building on classical 
7 
 
ideas, says that the bases of the beautiful are proportion, brightness (or radiance) and integrity 
(or non-defectiveness).22 The core meaning of the first of these is strictly mathematical, 
involving ratios and symmetries in naturally beautiful things and in visual art, and numerical 
harmonies in music.23  
Thus Plato comes close to actually identifying the Good with something mathematical. That 
renders his ideas less than adequate for understanding what we take ethics to be. 
It is therefore necessary to separate the two parts of Plato’s vision. His claim that study of 
mathematics is useful for appreciating eternal verities in ethics and elsewhere can be accepted 
without the need to accept his particular “mathematico-aesthetic” concept of the Good. In 
searching for realist foundations of ethics and their relation to mathematics, we will need to 
start again.24 
 
3. Mathematics and Eternal Verities: Realist Philosophies of Mathematics 
Traditionally, mathematics has been taken to be the study of eternal truths about an objective 
subject-matter. The incommensurability of the diagonal and side of a square, the logarithmic 
decay of the density of primes, and the existence of exactly 26 sporadic finite simple groups, 
appear to be unchanging, provably true facts about a terrain of mathematical entities that exists 
independently of human actions, knowledge or wishes. As Plato says, it would be ludicrous to 
interpret mathematicians’ talk of actions like adding numbers, constructing circles and 
extracting square roots as implying that mathematics is really about action. It is pure 
knowledge, “the knowledge of that which always is, and not of a something which at some 
time comes into being and passes away.”25 Arithmetic is normative for the actions of adding-
up by accountants, but it is itself neither essentially normative nor about actions. 
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Realist philosophies of mathematics offer various accounts of what eternal verities 
mathematics is in fact about (in contrast to nominalist philosophies which represent 
mathematics as a mere language of science, or method of deriving one substantive scientific 
truth from others, or manipulation of uninterpreted symbols). The most prominent realist 
philosophy of mathematics is Platonism, according to which numbers, sets and the like are 
classical “abstract objects”: acausal, atemporal objects existing necessarily in a Platonic realm, 
neither physical nor mental.26 Since Platonism (in and outside the philosophy of mathematics) 
is subject to a number of classic objections, it should be noted that there is an alternative realist 
philosophy of mathematics, Aristotelianism, which takes mathematics to be as necessarily true 
and contentful as does Platonism, but also takes it to be about properties of the physical world 
(and any other non-abstract world there may be) – properties such as symmetry, ratio, pattern, 
continuity and flow. 27 
It would take us too far afield to adjudicate between philosophies of mathematics. But the 
following example, a favourite of the Aristotelian school, shows in a simple way how provable 
mathematical necessities constrain what can happen in the physical world. That provides a 
model of how other abstract truths, such as ethical ones, can also bear on what is possible in 
the real world; and hence, how our understanding of such abstract truths can give us insight 
into the necessities inherent in the real world. 
In the early eighteenth century, the seven bridges of Königsberg (home of the young Kant) 





Fig 1  The bridges of Königsberg 
 
The citizens of that city noticed that it was impossible to walk over all the bridges once, without 
walking over at least one of them twice. Euler proved they were correct. (The essential idea of 
his proof is that walking into and out of a land area uses up two bridges, but since all the land 
areas have an odd number of bridges out of them, it is impossible to match up ins and outs to 
create a path over all the bridges without reusing some.)28 His proof applies directly the system 
of the bridges, not to any idealisation or abstraction of them. 
What one learns from mathematical examples like the Königsberg bridges is that there exists a 
world of necessities, understandable by pure thought, which have consequences in constraining 
the real (non-abstract) world. Mathematical necessities do not live just in a Platonic realm of 
“pure” mathematics but in our physical world.29 That opens one’s mind to becoming attuned 




That is not to claim that ethical necessity and mathematical necessity are identical. If it is 
mathematically impossible to walk over all the bridges just once, one does not have the choice 
of doing it. But if it were impossible to walk over all the bridges justly, one could still choose 
to walk over them. Ethical necessities constrain what it is possible to do rightly, which is not 
the same as constraining what it is possible to do mathematically or physically. But then one 
can ignore mathematical necessities if one chooses, for example the fact that 1 + 1 = 2 does not 
constrain accountants to always add $1 and $1 and get $2. 
 
4. Ethics and Eternal Verities: The Good Versus the Right 
Traditionally, ethics has not been understood as the study of eternal truths about an 
independently existing objective subject-matter in the way mathematics has been. It has been 
usual to see ethics as (solely or largely) about human actions – their rightness, their 
obligatoriness, what is a duty and what is permitted, which are virtuous. Even realist ethical 
positions that take it to be an objective matter which actions are right, such as Kantian 
universalisability or classical utilitarianism, suppose that it is fundamentally actions (or action-
oriented virtues) that exhibit moral qualities such as rightness. 
But to appreciate what Plato’s perspective has to offer in comparing mathematics with ethics, 
we need to follow him in seeing what is ethically admirable or criticisable as in the first instance 
something prior to actions. His choice is that ethics is centrally about excellence of character 
(arete) and the “just” ordering of the state. We need not accept those particular choices, much 
less Plato’s views on what constitutes excellence, to understand the general point that ethics is 
not fundamentally about what to do – even though the fundamental ethical facts have 
consequences for what to do and right action is certainly an important part of ethics. 
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There are two basic reasons for thinking that. Firstly, what we are most disturbed by ethically 
– what most violently forces itself on us as ethically objective – is not anything to do with 
actions, but the terribleness of suffering. What makes something a tragedy is first and foremost 
the happening of serious evil to some being of worth. 
Secondly, whenever we ask why some action is right or wrong, we find we are led back to 
reasons that are not themselves about action but concern the good or evil of those affected. For 
example, what makes the act of killing wrong is in the first place the evil of the death of the 
victim (rather than the action’s violating some rule or being contrary to some virtue). That 
explains why the rule against killing can be relaxed in the case of killing in self-defence, since 
then there is a conflict between the evils of the death of the victim and the death of the attacker. 
While the emphasis on actions and their evaluation has dominated ethics, two of its leading 
figures, Kant and Moore, stood for a position where the “good” (what was of moral worth in 
itself) contrasted with the “right”, which concerned actions. Moore states the contrast as a main 
theme of his Principia Ethica: 
I have tried in this book to distinguish clearly two kinds of question, which moral 
philosophers have always professed to answer, but which, as I have tried to shew, they 
have almost always confused both with one another and with other questions. These two 
questions may be expressed, the first in the form: What kind of things ought to exist for 
their own sakes? the second in the form: What kind of actions ought we to perform? 30 
Kant too, though discussing at length duties, rules and respect, sees at the bottom of ethics 
something not itself about actions, namely the dignity or worth of persons, which “exacts” 
respect and duties: 
Man regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is exalted 
above any price, for as a person he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of 
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others, or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he possesses a dignity 
(Würde) (an absolute inner worth (Werth)) by which he exacts respect for himself from 
all other rational beings in the world. He can measure himself with every other being of 
this kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them.31 
If “what ought to exist for its own sake” and “absolute inner worth” are objective notions at 
all, as Moore and Kant think, they must be the kinds of eternal verities of which Plato speaks, 
ethical counterparts of the verities that mathematics deals in. The same is true, indeed, of the 
ethical ideal of classical utilitarianism – it says that the action that contributes to the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number is right because the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
is an external absolute ideal (itself unrelated to action). In general, there are many things which 
are ends of action because we take them to be valuable in themselves – survival, health, 
artworks, the preservation of ecosystems, tenure. Aristotelian ethicists particularly emphasize 
the perfecting of human rational powers as a good for humans32 – and the notion of a perfection 
is one that is both paradigmatically ethical and paradigmatically not about action. The inherent 
value of these goods is what gives actions that promote them their ethical point. 
As with the philosophy of mathematics, it would take us too far afield to examine the realist 
options in the philosophy of the ethical good. One well-developed contemporary example is 
Nicholas Wolterstorff’s theory that locates natural rights in the respect due to the worth of the 
rights-holder, and holds the kind of entity having worth to be one having such human qualities 
as the capacity for rational agency and an inner life of thoughts and awareness of thoughts.33 





5. Objections: Clarke-Doane’s Morality and Mathematics 
It is certainly possible to emphasize the parallel between mathematics and ethics without 
believing in unique right answers to mathematical and ethical questions, as just defended. That 
is the position of Justin Clarke-Doane’s Morality and Mathematics. It rebuts various arguments 
for the lack of parallel between the two, but its view of both ethics and mathematics is close to 
the opposite of the one advanced here. A brief examination of its position and arguments will 
clarify the competing approaches to the parallel between ethics and mathematics. 
Clarke-Doane’s view of both mathematics and ethics is strictly speaking realist, but thoroughly 
pluralist. His realism consists in taking mathematical and ethical statements to be true of a 
mind- and language-independent subject-matter, when taken at face-value. His pluralism 
consists in holding that (almost) “anything goes” as to the unique truth of mathematical and 
ethical statements: on the model of the Parallel Postulate, they may be true or false, depending 
on context. He concludes that “our moral beliefs are contingent in a worrying way, and this 
may disqualify them from counting as safe, realistically construed. However, exactly the same 
thing is true of our mathematical beliefs.”34 There is one disanalogy between ethics and 
mathematics, however, in that ethics must issue in decision and one can only decide to do one 
thing, so in that special sense ethics is “objective”. The contingency of mathematical beliefs 
can be resolved by pluralism, as can beliefs about what is right; it is just practical decisions that 
must achieve a unique resolution. 
Clarke-Doane not unreasonably takes a degree of pluralism to be widely accepted in ethics but 
not in mathematics, so devotes most effort to defending it in mathematics. Certainly if 
pluralism in mathematics were correct, it would undermine the position advocated in this 
article, so his arguments need careful consideration. 
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He has two arguments. One is the reference to the Parallel Postulate, which he takes to 
generalize to most mathematical statements. The second is taken from the disagreement 
observed among set theorists as to whether the Axiom of Choice, the Continuum Hypothesis 
and other propositions are “really” true of “the” universe of sets. The natural thing to conclude 
is that, like the Parallel Postulate, none is uniquely true and one may choose which of them to 
accept – or more accurately, one may suppose that each can be taken to be true of its own 
universe; that is, one accepts pluralism about the subject-matter. 
These two arguments are not the same and fail for different reasons. The Parallel Postulate is 
not a proposition (and hence cannot be true or false), because it is underspecified. “The plane 
has a finite number of points” is not a proposition because it has not been specified which 
mathematical structure is being spoken of – the 7-point plane has a finite number of points, the 
Euclidean plane doesn’t. Similarly, “In the Euclidean plane, given a line and a point not on the 
line, there is exactly one line through the point which does not meet the original line” is a 
proposition (the Parallel Postulate in the Euclidean plane) and is true (absolutely). 
Underspecification of propositions does not lead to philosophical pluralism about a subject-
matter; that would be a too-easy strategy to “prove” pluralism anywhere. 
On the other hand, set theory, like number theory, has a unique intended interpretation (namely, 
sets) and statements such as the Axiom of Choice and the Continuum Hypothesis are intended 
to be true and false of that interpretation. So they are not, in their intended interpretation, 
underspecified. It has come to be agreed, after a century and more of work, that many of those 
statements are going to remain controversial and hence that the higher set theory does not admit 
of axiomatization by self-evident axioms and rules. One may speculate that there “exist” (in 
some Platonic sense) both Axiom-of-Choice and non-Axiom-of-Choice set universes, but that 
is itself controversial. An alternative view would be that the whole logic-based project of proofs 
about sets has come adrift from (Platonic) reality and there are just no very large sets, or if 
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there are we know nothing about them (though it is hard to know where to draw the line: for 
present purposes there is no need to decide if real analysis as used in physics is certain or not). 
In any case, it can be conceded that beliefs about higher set theory have, in Clarke-Doane’s 
words about mathematical beliefs in general, no “claim to being self-evident, provable, 
plausible or analytic”.35 
However, those advocating a parallel between certainty in mathematics and ethics do not 
propose to compare ethics with higher set theory, but with core mathematics. There is no sense 
in which basic mathematics, from the paradigmatic “2 + 2 = 4” to the ordinary results of linear 
algebra and discrete optimization, is founded on the axioms of set theory. Although the name 
“foundations of mathematics” has been retained for historical reasons, arising from Frege and 
Russell’s hope that mathematics might be so founded, it had become evident at least by 1910 
that that was unlikely to happen. As Clarke-Doane quotes Russell, “We tend to believe the 
premises [i.e. set-theory axioms] because we can see that their consequences are true, instead 
of believing the consequences because the premises are true.”36 That only makes sense if we 
can in fact “see that their consequences are true,” that is, have confidence that 2 + 2 = 4 because 
we can see why it must be true (or in somewhat more complex cases, see how it follows from 
more basic truths). The proof of Euler’s result about the Königsberg bridges, for example, 
which was briefly outlined above, does not have the Axiom of Choice lurking among the 
premises and threatening to undermine it. It proceeds from evident premises, observably true 
of physical bridges, by evident steps.37 
Clarke-Doane does in fact admit that it is not as easy to be pluralist about number theory as it 
is about the higher set theory, agreeing that “God seems to have created a unique set of 
(positive) integers, but myriad variations on other structures.”38 [emphasis in original] 
Presumably the truths about those unique integers are also unique and locked in and hence  
pluralism about arithmetic is untenable. 
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Clarke-Doane’s views on ethics differ from those advanced here principally in his assumption 
(of course widely shared) that ethics is essentially about practical decision-making – of 
deciding what to do. He says that any abstract principles in ethics would fail to determine what 
to do.39 It is true that there is a logical gap between “this natural ecosystem is inherently 
valuable” and “its being valuable is an ethical reason not to vandalize it”, and another logical 
gap between that and “My decision is to vandalize it.” Nevertheless the first bears on the second 
and the second on the third (for reasons the realist philosopher of ethics must explain, but which 
cannot be developed here). Since the present paper compares mathematical statements with 
axiological ethical statements like “this natural ecosystem is valuable” rather than conclusions 
of practical ethics like “I ought not to vandalize this ecosystem”, Clarke-Doane’s 
considerations about ethics are not directly relevant. 
So Clarke-Doane’s comparison of mathematics with ethics differs widely from the present one 
because of the different choices of paradigms in mathematics and ethics. His paradigms are 
respectively higher set theory and individual practical decisions. That is very unlike comparing, 
as here, axiology and arithmetic. 
 
6. Equality and Symmetry Arguments in Mathematics 
Equality is, paradigmatically, a central concept of mathematics. Mathematical writing is full of 
equations. Symmetry, central to algebra and mathematical physics, concerns the equality of 
parts of a system (in some respect such as shape). To have bilateral symmetry (the simplest 
form of symmetry) is just to consist of two parts equal in some respect; for example to be a 
palindrome is to have the second half of the text repeating the first in the opposite order. 
The ability of arguments from symmetry to generate contentful propositions of (applied) 
mathematics is well illustrated in Archimedes’ derivation of the law of the lever, an example 
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which much impressed the creators of the Scientific Revolution and led to successful efforts to 
emulate it.40 Following it in detail (in a simple case) is useful for Platonic training of the soul 
in a mathematical necessity. 
The law of the balance states that two weights on a beam supported by a fulcrum balance each 
other if the ratios of the weights is the inverse of the ratios of their distances from the fulcrum. 
That is, lighter weights far away can balance heavy weights closer in. Archimedes does not 
regard this as a physical law needing experimental support but offers to demonstrate it from 
absolutely certain first principles. In the simplest example, where one weight is twice the other, 




Fig 2a  A weight of 2 close to the fulcrum balances a weight of 1 twice as far away 
 
To prove that weights so positioned do balance, Archimedes first extends the (weightless) beam 







Fig 2b  The beam is extended so that the fulcrum is in the middle 
 
 
The weights are now imagined as malleable, like clay, and are gently patted down to rest 





Fig 2c  The weights are patted down to rest uniformly on the beam 
 
We see that in the final state, weight is uniformly distributed, with equal amounts each side of 
the fulcrum. So by symmetry the weights must balance. Therefore the original pair of weights 
must balance. All there is at the bottom of the argument is the equality of the pieces on each 
side of the fulcrum, which causes them to balance; “equal weights at equal distances are in 
equilibrium.” That obvious and apparently innocuous principle of equality is parlayed by 
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Archimedes’ genius into a complex theory of contentful propositions about the balancing of 
unequal weights at unequal distances.41 
The role of symmetry in mathematical physics has only increased since then, to the extent that 
“In the latter half of the 20th century symmetry has been the most dominant concept in the 
exploration and formulation of the fundamental laws of physics.”42 
A mathematical example with perhaps even closer analogies to ethics is probability. As is well 
known, complicated questions about the probability of events in games with dice and cards are 
solved by counting the numbers of equiprobable outcomes. The probability of two dice giving 
a total of 2 (that is, of both showing 1) is 1/36, while the probability of their giving a total of 3 
(that is, one of them showing 1 and the other 2) is 2/36. The reason is that the first event consists 
of one of the 36 basic equiprobable outcomes of two dice (1 and 1), while the second event 
consists of two of them (1 and 2, and 2 and 1). It is the equiprobability of the basic outcomes 
that reduces problems in probability to the pure mathematics of counting. The equiprobability 
of the basic outcomes, it is agreed, results from a symmetry argument. Outcomes such as the 
36 possible falls of two dice are equiprobable because there is in some sense a symmetry 
between them. Debate has been heated as to what this symmetry consists in – is it the physical 
symmetry of the dice? The equality of the long run observed relative frequency of outcomes? 
Our equal ignorance of the outcomes? Those are fair questions, but the calculation of outcomes 
does not depend on answering them. Provided the equiprobability of the basic outcomes is 
granted, they can be counted to give the probabilities of combinations of them. 
As Pascal, the discoverer of mathematical probability, said, it is surprising that chance is 
subject to such strict mathematical methods: “by thus uniting the demonstrations of 
mathematics to the uncertainty of chance, and reconciling what seem contraries, it can take its 
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name from both sides, and rightly claim the astonishing title: the Geometry of chance (aleae 
Geometria).”43 
The ability of symmetry principles to produce contentful truths about the worlds of physics and 
probability can act, in Platonic fashion, as an inspiration for ethics. If it is surprising that ethics 
is subject to symmetry arguments, it is no more so than that chance is. 
 
7. Equality and Symmetry Arguments in Ethics 
Ethics can follow applied mathematics into objectivist territory by also relying on symmetry 
arguments, or deductions from equality, provided it can give some minimal account of why the 
equality holds. 
The best-known example of what might be called the “Archimedean spirit” in ethics, of 
deducing a complex ethical theory from a symmetry principle, is Rawls’ Theory of Justice. 
Rawls regards distributive justice as dealing with “the way in which the major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages 
from social cooperation.” (Rawls, 1999, 6) He proposes to deduce just distributive 
arrangements from some assumptions about an “initial position,” in which individuals must 
choose principles from behind a “veil of ignorance,” which allows them self-interest and 
knowledge of general facts about human nature, but no knowledge of what position in society 
they will be born into. Rawls’ model of deduction is a Euclidean one. “We should strive for a 
kind of moral geometry,” he writes, “with all the rigor which this name connotes.”44 
Fundamental to the principles is equality: they are “the principles that free and rational persons 
concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as 
defining the fundamental terms of their association.”45 
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Rawls denies to the participants in the initial position any substantive moral knowledge or 
conceptions of the good life. That throws even more weight on the pure symmetry between 
participants as bare moral agents, as Rawls recognizes. He writes, 
the parties are symmetrically situated in the original position. This models our considered 
conviction that in matters of basic political justice citizens are equal in all relevant 
respects: that is, that they possess to a sufficient degree the requisite powers of moral 
personality and the other capacities that enable them to be normal and fully cooperating 
members of society over a complete life. Thus, in accordance with the precept of formal 
equality that those equal (similar) in all relevant respects are to be treated equally 
(similarly), citizens’ representatives are to be situated symmetrically in the original 
position.46 
On the question of where the equality comes from, Rawls’ official position is that his concept 
of equality is “political, not metaphysical”. Thus (as in discussions of the meaning of 
probability), he aims to retain the obviousness of and widespread agreement on equality 
without difficult discussions on what it is about humans that makes them equal. However, 
avoiding foundational inquiry entirely is rarely possible in philosophy, and Rawls does have a 
brief discussion of the “basis of equality” which gives a sketch of his answer. Asking why 
animals do not count as participants in the original position, he says that “equal justice is owed 
to those who have the capacity to take part in and to act in accordance with the public 
understanding of the initial situation.”47 His use of “capacity” to extend rights beyond those 
who can actually understand to infants and the severely disabled indicates a degree of 
metaphysical stance on human nature. 
Rawls’ ambition is restricted to explaining political arrangements. It does not extend to ethics 
in general, such as the ethics of ordinary interpersonal relationships. Plainly bare and 
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impersonal principles of equality are more suited to the discussion of political arrangements 
than to loving relationships between family and friends. Nevertheless, if we do look beyond 
the political realm, the principle of equality interacts with more substantive ethical principles 
and moderates how they work. We will look at a few brief examples. 
Love, in its various senses, is central to ethics and is necessarily particular. Yet Jesus’s call to 
“love your neighbour as yourself” expresses a widely-felt urge to include all within the ambit 
of loving behavior, such as charity, as far as possible. Natural and ethical ways in which one 
prefers and acts on behalf of one’s family are properly restricted by laws against nepotism. 
The substantive right to an education, based on allowing human rationality to be realized, 
implies educational actions, but not necessarily identical actions for each child. The 
circumstances of people matter, and they enter into the calculation. An equal right of children 
to a fair share of educational resources, for example, will require different actions in the cases 
of a musical or mathematical prodigy, a well-adjusted child of average intelligence, and an 
intellectually disabled child. All have rights to education, but the plans must be tailored to each 
child’s abilities to profit from teaching, and one plan may cost more than another. That is 
typical of how variable circumstances interact with equality. (In Aristotle’s mathematical 
language, the just distribution is proportional rather than numerically equal.48) 
Naturally, that leads to long debates on the detailed consequences of the principle of equality, 
with for example a need to resolve the tension between equality of outcomes and equality of 
opportunity, what weight should be given the claims of the worst off, and the like. Those 
debates cannot be settled simply by appealing the equality of persons. Nevertheless the ideal 
of equality is not vacuous. Appeals to equality of consideration are always very powerful. And 
that does not mean merely that equality is weighted heavily in comparison with other 
considerations. It means that any other consideration, such as skin colour or age or wealth, is 
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by default of absolutely no weight, and the moral relevance of any consideration must be 
established in the face of the strong presumption against its relevance. Thus in the 1858 
Lincoln-Douglas debates on slavery, Stephen Douglas was probably right as a matter of 
historical fact to claim that the writers of the Declaration of Independence had only had white 
men in mind in “all men are created equal,” but Abraham Lincoln’s case that the logic implied 
equality for all prevailed.49 
“Our” (post-Christian and post-Enlightenment) ethics has become egalitarian in principle, to 
the extent that “The principle of equal dignity and respect is now accepted as a minimum 
standard throughout mainstream Western culture.”50 But it should not be forgotten that ethics 
without a principle of the equality of persons is possible and has been commonplace 
historically. As we saw, ancient Greek ethics was barely aware of such a principle, and so 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethics is alien to ours. Slave-owning societies of course recognized no 
such principle. In contemporary ethics, the most prominent denier of the principle is Peter 
Singer. Singer’s ethics is very mathematical, rigorously deduced from a principle of equality, 
but not the equality of persons. It rests on the “basic principle of equality: the principle of equal 
consideration of interests.” All interests are equal; “an interest is an interest, whoever’s interest 
it may be.”51 Thus, an animal’s pain is entitled to equal consideration to an equal pain in a 
human. That principle has been responsible for Singer’s controversial and radical departures 
from traditional ethics, such as his defence of the permissibility of infanticide for healthy 
babies. “The preference utilitarian reason for respecting the life of a person cannot apply to a 
newborn baby. A newborn baby cannot see itself as a being which might or might not have a 
future, and so cannot have a desire to continue living.”52 Singer’s preference utilitarianism 
counts interests (as equal) in abstraction from the beings whose interests they are, and the latter 
do not count morally in themselves. 
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These dramatic implications of divergence from a principle of equality of persons reveal the 
moral significance of the principle itself. It is neither meaningless nor vacuous nor infinitely 
flexible. Nor is it widely agreed, if we speak cross-culturally and cross-temporarily. 
 
8. Mathematising Vice: Game Theory and Replacements for Ethics 
There is a dark side to the relation of mathematics to ethics. Insights into mathematics can be 
use in ways productive of evil. Mathematical models such as those just discussed, which 
implement a realist philosophy of ethics, can be better understood by contrasting them with 
models whose purpose is to undermine ethical realism by setting up an alternative model of the 
behavior we normally call ethical. They model humans as a different and non-moral kind of 
entity, such as a purely self-interested economic actor, or a tool of selfish genes, and attempt 
to generate a system of behavior which mimics and replaces ethics. 
Best-known are the economic theories in which the individual human involved in economic 
activity is modelled as homo economicus, a lone consumer regarded as self-interested and 
rational enough to pursue his/her interests optimally. But the relation of this perspective to an 
ethical one is ambiguous. While the rhetoric of “self-interest” suggests that agents do not act 
ethically in the interests of others, that is not essential to the model, whose primary aim is to 
explain collective economic behavior in terms of agents’ actual interests. Actual interests may 
be either genuinely ethical or not. An interest in children’s education can produce a market in 
school fees and an interest in philanthropy can produce a market in charitable services as easily 
as a desire for fast cars can produce a market in Lamborghinis.53 Economic models of this kind 
are therefore not as contrary to an objective moral stance as supposed by their political 
opponents who accuse them of “rampant individualism”. 
25 
 
It is otherwise with evolutionary models of ethical behavior, which really are corrosive of 
realist ethics.  
The Darwinian theory of evolution initially had a problem with explaining altruistic behavior 
in organisms, since it was mysterious how altruistic and even self-sacrificing traits could have 
evolved in natural competition “red in tooth and claw”. From the mid-twentieth century, a 
number of “inclusive fitness” and “selfish gene” mathematical models of evolution explained 
how natural selection could favour altruism, through such mechanisms as organisms sacrificing 
themselves for conspecifics with whom they shared genes. 
While those theories were strictly scientific and so should have implied no “oughts”, it soon 
became evident that they offered exciting possibilities for explaining ethics away. Altruistic 
behavior, in these models, is driven not by any moral considerations but by an organism’s 
acting as a puppet of “selfish genes” or some other purely causal evolutionary force.54 If 
(apparently) ethical behavior like altruism is an inevitable effect of natural selection pressures, 
“morality is seen as the unintended side-effect of the interactions of agents.”55 So it seems to 
be explained without remainder in terms of natural causes, leaving no role for anything 
objectively ethical that could judge some evolved behavior as wrong. Evolutionarily evolved 
behaviors (and beliefs) would not be expected to “track” objective moral truths, if there were 
any, and hence the posit of objective ethical truths would be a “spare wheel” that might as well 
be dispensed with.56 Moral “error theorists” seized on that implication as a confirmation of 
their view that the whole idea of ethics is a mistake.57 
It soon also became evident that parallel explanations were inevitable of behaviors which 
lacked the rosy moral glow of altruism. Martin Nowak’s work on the mathematics of 
evolutionary game theory explains the rise of cooperation, but points out that tribal warfare and 
nepotism are also behaviors that would be expected to arise from organisms favouring the 
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conspecifics who most share their genes.58 He does not mention that rape and genocide are 
equally efficient means of increasing the frequency of one’s genes in subsequent generations, 
techniques taken advantage of by Genghis Khan to produce an estimated 16 million living 
descendants.59 The most salient indicator of who one shares genes with is race, so racism is 
also a behavior to be expected as a result of evolution.60 
But rape, racism and genocide are evils and their role in evolution is entirely incapable of 
providing an excuse for them. As moral realists point out, to explain morality wholly in terms 
of evolved strategies is to leave oneself without a standpoint from which to evaluate a behavior 
such as altruism as good and one such as genocide as bad. 
The comparison of realist and anti-realist mathematical models of ethics therefore shows that 
a devotion to mathematics is not, as Plato seems to suggest, automatically productive of insight 
into the Good. Mathematics in relation to ethics can be used for good or ill. Realism about 
ethical realities needs to be imported into the philosophy of ethics from a source outside 
mathematics itself (for example, from an insight into the worth of persons). 
 
9. Conclusion 
W.D. Ross wrote in 1930: 
That an act, qua fulfilling a promise, or qua effecting a just distribution of good, 
or qua returning services rendered, or qua promoting the virtue or insight of the agent, 
is prima facie right … is self-evident just like a mathematical axiom, or the validity of a 
form of inference, is evident. The moral order expressed in these propositions is just as 
much part of the fundamental nature of the universe (and, we may add, of any possible 
universe in which there were moral agents at all) as is the spatial or numerical structure 
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expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic. In our confidence that these 
propositions are true there is involved the same trust in our reason that is involved in our 
confidence in mathematics; and we should have no justification for trusting it in the latter 
sphere and distrusting it in the former.  In both cases we are dealing with propositions 
that cannot be proved, but that just as certainly need no proof.61 
Since then, many relativist and historicist currents have undermined that kind of robust belief 
in the absolute objectivity of ethical truths. Those currents have had less success with 
undermining belief in mathematical truths, and earlier philosophies of mathematics that 
dismissed mathematics as a mere language or heap of tautologies have waned. Leading 
philosophies of mathematics are realist, supporting Ross’s view that the mathematical structure 
of the universe is part of its fundamental and necessary nature and that the most central truths 
describing it are knowable with certainty. The parallels between mathematics and ethics 
suggest that the same can be said of the ethical structure of reality, thus reviving the essentials 
of Plato’s view that mathematics is the ideal body of knowledge for inducing in the soul an 
understanding of ethical truths. 
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